Hello BOB.... Barber how long have you been with thermotron?
I hear lots of bad things about them, do you work from home?
I haven't been here very long at all. Though I am by no means a seasoned veteran, I am a bit surprised that you hear lots of bad things about Thermotron.
What are some of the things that you hear?
(Please don't take this as me trying to discredit your statement, because that is certainly not my intention).
I know one thing that we do have problems with at times is finding enough qualified service technicians to give the customers the appropriate ammount of attention. Please feel free to share publicly or privately. I'm open to any and all feedback
I hear management likes the "work from home concept", they give you a fax machine and set you up with accounts..
the main problems are lack of support and most of the time you don’t make the 40 hours, at some point there was a woman running the show and she didn’t know much about anything but screwing with techs pay,
are you a tech-salesman?,
I met an ex-thermotron tech through RSES and he hated them with passion.
Bob have a couple of questions.
I noticed that you said they were always looking for technicians.
When I was at the school they were trying to hire almost everyone who went through the class.
Which considering that most of us had paid to attend the class I felt it was in very bad taste.
Also do they still have their stance that they will not sell parts or anything to contractors because they are competition? I am just curious.
DEAN TRIPP said that when he worked "with" tom Bannach on the west coast.. that Tom Bannach was always trying to build a case "AGAINST" his co-workers.. so he could "defraud" them..and that tom bannach "really" didn not have the skill or "CHARACTER" to be a MANAGER...
Contact: All temp Engineering.. in california ... ask mitch kerr or JOHN DANE..
www.alltempengineering.com
ask them what they think about thermotron.. MANAGERS.. and co-workers they knew..
Mitch Kerr's ..THERMOTRON REPLACEMENT... Gregory V Johnson..
Bragged that it didn't matter what Lies you said about your co-workers.. and who you robbed.. so long as you got away with it.!!
and it didn't matter at thermotron is the equipment worked or not...
"you are supposted to deceive the customer and get them to sign off on it!!"
Russles Technical Products asked one former Thermotron employee why he left...
he was told.. that Tom Bannach was lying to everyone, and it didn't matter if you did a Good job... or a BAd job... any more..
Thomas Patterson laughed .. and said ... ya ... that's tom .. 4..U
MODEL CRIMINAL CODE CHAPTER 3: CONSPIRACY TO DEFRAUD - DISCUSSION PAPERDate: 30/06/1996 12:00:00 AM
Title: Model Criminal Code Chapter 3: Conspiracy to Defraud - Discussion Paper
Type: Policy & Advocacy: Submission
Abstract: To: The Officers Committee of the Standing Committee of Attorney-Generals
Whether the abolition of the offence of conspiracy to defraud would leave gaps in the law The first issue raised by the Discussion Paper (Discussion Paper) titled Model Criminal Code Chapter 3 Conspiracy to Defraud, issued by the Model Criminal Code (MCC) Officers Committee of the Standing Committee of Attorneys-General (Committee), is whether the abolition of the offence of conspiracy to defraud would leave gaps in the law. The Discussion Paper concludes that a number of the possible gaps which might have been covered by the offence of conspiracy to defraud are specifically addressed in the MCC, or alternatively should not be the subject of specific prohibitions. The Institute agrees with the conclusion reached in the Discussion Paper, namely that such gaps would not justify the retention of the offence of conspiracy to defraud.
The Discussion Paper also notes that the offence of conspiracy to defraud may operate as a "legislative gap filler" in tax and corporate fraud cases, and recognises the view that this function may be inconsistent with certainty and non-retrospectivity in the criminal law. At the same time, the Discussion Paper recognises the contrary view, that the offence of conspiracy to defraud supplies a "legitimate and necessary means of catching novel forms of dishonesty which have escaped the specific attention of the legislature". A case in point, recognised by the Discussion Paper, is the use of the offence of conspiracy to defraud in prosecutions relating to "bottom of the harbour" schemes in the 1980s. On balance, the Institute agrees that it is desirable to retain the offence of conspiracy to defraud, in order to deal with novel offences which have not been the subject of specific statutory prohibition.
Use of the offence of conspiracy to defraud in prosecutions relating to breaches of directors' duties The Discussion Paper notes the possibility that cases involving directors' duties, such as Yuill (1994) 77 A Crim R 314, could have proceeded as prosecutions for conspiracy to defraud rather than for breaches of directors' duties to act honestly. The Discussion Paper goes on to suggest that the retention of the offence of conspiracy to defraud is supported by "the fact that the directors' duties provisions of the Corporations Law (the combination of s1317FA and s232) are so extraordinarily complex and arguably unworkable", and by the possibility that "the stigma of a conviction for [directors' duties] offences and the available penalties may not adequately reflect their true criminality" (p25).There appears to be a misunderstanding on the part of the Committee in its evaluation of the current interpretation of rules which prohibit behaviour by directors in terms not dissimilar to the terms of an action for a conspiracy to defraud. Whilst there was a perception for many years that the general prohibitions against directors which involved, amongst other things, misusing their position, misusing information, or failing to act with appropriate honesty, were too difficult to establish in the courts, a series of recent cases, culminating in the High Court decision of R v Byrnes ((1995 130 ALR 529), demonstrates that the courts can and do, in appropriate circumstances, deal with these issues in a satisfactory way. It is suggested that the Committee examine these decisions, which the Institute believes will lead it to make some amendments to their comments in relation to the difficulty of pursuing claims against directors based on breaches of the Corporations Law.
The Corporate Law Simplification Task Force has also recommended that section 232(2) of the Corporations Law be amended by replacing the current wording (the duty to act honestly) with wording that will be along the lines that "Directors must act in good faith and for a proper purpose". This is in line with the common law duty on the part of directors, and may well eliminate any concerns which Committee may have in relation to the scope of this duty.
Further, while the introduction of the civil penalty provisions in Part 9.4B of the Corporations Law has undoubtedly complicated the Law, those provisions adopt recommendations made by the Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs in November 1989, namely that breaches of the duty of care, diligence and good faith owed by directors should be subject only to civil penalties, where no dishonesty or intent to deceive exists. The Institute notes that, if no dishonesty or intent to defraud exists, the offence of conspiracy to defraud would not be established in any event, and will therefore add nothing to the law of directors' duties. If dishonesty or an intent to deceive exists, criminal sanctions are already available in relation to contraventions of the civil penalty provisions under s1317FA of the Corporations Law. A person convicted of such a contravention is liable to a maximum penalty of $200,000 and/or 5 years imprisonment and is prohibited from managing a corporation for 5 years except by leave of the Court.
The Institute is concerned that the use of the offence of conspiracy to defraud in proceedings relating to breaches of directors duties could be inconsistent with the provisions in the Corporations Law which deal with the timing of civil and criminal proceedings for breaches of directors' duties. Section 1317FB of the Corporations Law prevents the commencement of criminal proceedings for an offence constituted by a contravention of a civil penalty provision, if a person has already applied for a civil penalty order in relation to the same contravention, even if the application has been finally determined or otherwise disposed of. This section recognises the improper disadvantage to a defendant, if criminal proceedings could be brought against a defendant after the prosecution had taken advantage of the liberal rules relating to discovery in civil proceedings (Explanatory Memorandum to the Corporate Law Reform Bill 1992, para. 148). If the offence of conspiracy to defraud is to be retained, s1317FB should be amended to prevent criminal proceedings for conspiracy to defraud being brought if a person had already applied for a civil penalty order in relation to the same matter.
The Institute agrees with the view expressed at page 37 of the Discussion Paper that, where a substantive offence can be charged, that should be done rather than a charge of conspiracy to defraud being brought. In particular, the Institute is concerned at the possible use of the offence of conspiracy to defraud in prosecutions where the civil penalty regime introduced by Part 9.4B of the Corporations Law would otherwise apply. As a general proposition, the Institute considers that the offence of conspiracy to defraud should not be relied upon in prosecutions where an existing legislative prohibition is applicable. In particular, the use of the offence of conspiracy to defraud as a substitute for, or in combination with, the statutory offences created by s232 of the Corporations Law, would lead to uncertainty, and possibly to oppression of defendants who were faced with charges brought under each head.
The Institute notes that the maximum penalty of imprisonment for 5 years proposed for the offence of conspiracy to defraud is the same as the maximum penalty which is available for the breach of a civil penalty provision involving dishonesty or an intention to deceive or defraud under s1317FA and Schedule 3 of the Corporations Law. By contrast with the reasoning adopted at page 37 of the Discussion Paper in relation to the offences of theft and deception, this will provide no disincentive for the prosecution to charge conspiracy to defraud rather than relying on the substantive offences created by the Corporations Law.
Form of any offence of conspiracy to defraud A further issue raised by the Discussion Paper is the form which any offence of conspiracy to defraud should take. Proposed clause 17.4 of the MCC extends the offence of conspiracy to defraud beyond an intent to cause loss or imperil the economic interests of another, to an intent to cause gain. The Discussion Paper recognises that the inclusion of an intent to cause gain could cause uncertainty, since the class of transactions where a persons intends to make a gain for that person is substantially wider than where a person intends to cause loss to another.
The Institute shares this concern, particularly where a company and its directors or officers could be alleged to be party to a conspiracy to defraud, by reason of deliberations of those directors or officers on behalf of that company. For example, a company may adopt an advertising strategy which is intended to increase its sales and thereby to make a gain, and its officers or directors may participate in the decision to adopt that strategy. This ordinary commercial decision would satisfy each element of proposed clause 17.4 of the MCC, other than the element of dishonesty. The Institute considers that the concept of "dishonesty" should not be left as the only barrier to routine commercial activities undertaken by companies and their officers and directors, bringing gain for the corporate entity, being classed as conspiracies to defraud.
The Institute submits that it would be preferable if the proposed clause 17.4 was limited, as is the general law of conspiracy to defraud, to the substantially smaller class of actions which are intended to cause a loss to another, imperil a person's economic interests or influence the exercise of a public duty. It notes that the extension of proposed clause 17.4 to conduct involving an intention to cause a gain appears to be inconsistent with the reasoning which led the Committee to reject a general dishonesty offence in the MCC.
The Discussion Paper recommends that conspiracy to defraud should be limited to economic gains or losses, except in the case of influencing the exercise of a public duty. Subject to its comments in paragraphs 3.2-3.2 above as to the undesirability of extending the offence to conduct intended to cause a gain, the Institute considers that such a limitation is appropriate.
Element of "intent" The Institute notes that proposed clause 17.4(2) seeks to apply clause 11.5 of the MCC, with any necessary modification, to an offence against proposed clause 17.4. The Institute is concerned that it is unclear what modification should be made to clause 11.5(2)(b), in relation to the element of intent, in its application to clause 17.4, and considers that this should be clarified in the MCC. In particular, it is not clear that the clauses 17.4 and 11.5(2)(b), read together, would be sufficient to retain the principle that conspiracy to defraud may be established where a person has an intent to place at risk the economic interests of others although not necessarily to cause loss to them, as in Wai yu-Tsang [1992] 1 AC 269.
Mark Lamers President at Thermotron Industries, Holland, MI Mark Lamers President
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